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Abstract
We consider the problem of regulating an economy with environmental pollution. We
examine the distributional impact of the polluter-pays principle which requires that any
agent compensates all other agents for the damages caused by his or her (pollution) emis-
sions. With constant marginal damages we show that regulation via the polluter-pays
principle leads to the unique welfare distribution that induces non-negative individual
welfare change and renders each agent responsible for his or her pollution impact. We ex-
tend both the polluter-pays principle and this result to increasing marginal damages due
to pollution. We also compare the polluter-pays principle with the Vickrey-Clark-Groves
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1 Introduction
From water management to air pollution, managing environmental problems efficiently re-
quires well-designed public policies or coordination among stakeholders (Ostrom, 1990). En-
vironmental policies are launched to mitigate the failure of market economy due to the presence
of negative externalities. Yet public intervention has an impact not only on the social welfare
of the economy as a whole but also on the distribution of welfare. Although the economics
literature on the choice of environmental regulations tends to focus on efficiency, the way in-
struments affect individuals’ welfare matters a lot in practice. It determines their success or
failure in democratic societies as citizens might oppose regulations that hurt them or that are
perceived unfair. Equity is a main determinant of policy options on environmental issues.
Fairness principles are central in the debate on climate change mitigation policies. Several
have been invoked during international climate negotiations, leading to conflicting policy rec-
ommendations. Developed countries are mostly in favor of the sovereignty principle. Under
the premise that all nations have equal rights to the atmosphere, it takes current greenhouse
gas emissions levels as the status-quo. It implies that limitations on future emissions should
be proportional to current ones. In contrast, developing countries support the responsibility
principle. Brazil argued during the Kyoto negotiation that responsibility for compensating en-
vironmental damage should be related to the degree of responsibility for its causes. It implies
that emission reductions should be proportional to historical contribution (Heyward, 2007).1
We analyze the fairness properties of welfare distributions implemented (in Nash equilib-
rium) by regulation schemes in an economic environment with pollution. The model allows
for a variety of negative externalities including unilateral or multilateral ones, heterogenous
impacts due to distance or mitigation. It formalizes many complex environmental issues such
as water quality management in a river or the reduction of sulfur dioxide or greenhouse gas
emissions in an international setting.2 We assess the performance of welfare distributions
regarding two fairness criteria.
Our first criterion is a lower bound on the change of individual welfare: it should be non-
1Lange, Lo¨schel, Vogt and Ziegler (2010) provide evidence that the fairness principles invoked by negotiator
are consistent with the interest of the country they represent.
2To that respect, it is as rich as the seminal model of Montgomery (1972).
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negative (whereby the welfare change is measured against some alternative in which no harm is
incurred from pollution). It is a minimal acceptability requirement since an agent with negative
welfare change does not benefit from the welfare-enhancing economic activities exhibiting
pollution. As long as pollution improves social welfare, nobody should lose compared to the
situation of no pollution.
Our second criterion relies on the concept of responsibility in the theory of justice (Fleur-
baey, 2008). It makes a polluter responsible for his pollution impact on society. More precisely,
if a polluter modifies the environmental impact of his own emissions in the economy, he should
get the full return or loss due to this change. For instance, a firm which filters its own emis-
sions to reduce their sulfur content should get the full benefit for the economy of its cleaning
investment. A farmer who uses more pesticides and fertilizers leading to dirtier waste water
should pay the social cost associated to this pesticide and fertilizer increase.3
The polluter-pays welfare distributions are the welfare distributions implemented by a
regulation inspired by a literal interpretation of the polluter-pays (PP) principle. The PP
principle states that the costs of pollution should be borne by the entity which profits from the
process that causes pollution.4 It is commonly invoked in practice during policy discussions
on environmental issues. The PP-scheme requires that any agent compensates all agents who
suffer from his pollution emissions for the damage he causes. When marginal damages due
to pollution are constant, the PP welfare distributions are the only ones that satisfy non-
negativity and responsibility of pollution impact.
The case of increasing marginal damages raises additional issues, and to address these we
need a third criterion, which is an upper bound on individual welfare. It is the maximal welfare
an agent (or a single polluter) can obtain subject to compensating all other agents for the
damage due to pollution and all other agents being inactive (or emitting no pollution). When
3In practice, it is sometimes difficult to determine the entity which is responsible for pollution. It is a
central issue in Coase (1960). For instance, Coase mentions the case of straying cattle which destroy crops on
neighboring land. Legal liability for the destroyed crops is unclear. He states that “... it is true that there
would be no crop damage without the cattle. It is equally true that there would be no crop damage without
the crop.” It is implicitly assumed here that the polluter can be clearly identified.
4See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polluter pays principle and Principle 16 in the Rio Declaration on Envi-
ronment and Development.
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environmental damages are increasing with pollution concentration, polluters exert negative
externalities among them: the fact that some agents are polluting reduces the ability of others
to pollute. Since an agent is not responsible for the pollution emitted by others, he would
claim the social welfare of his activity if he was the only one to pollute. The single-polluter
welfare cannot be assigned to all agents. Thus, by solidarity, single-polluter upper bounds
requires that every agent takes up a share of the negative externalities among polluters by
enjoying not more than his single-polluter welfare.
When marginal damages are increasing with pollution concentration, the PP principle is
not straightforwardly defined because the cost generated by an emitter depends on the other
polluters’ emissions. We extend the PP principle to this framework by making the polluter
pay for the incremental impact of his emissions on the total welfare of the other agents when
he does pollute and when he does not pollute (at the efficient levels of pollution). As a result,
each polluter receives in the PP welfare distribution the difference of society’s welfare when
he does pollute and when he does not pollute. Under increasing marginal damages, the PP
welfare distributions are the only ones that satisfy the above three criteria: non-negativity,
responsibility for pollution impact and single-polluter upper bounds.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first contribution to characterize the welfare
distributions induced by the polluter-pays principle via fairness properties. The PP-scheme
is by construction feasible because it induces no budget deficit. It is also efficient in the
sense that it uniquely implements the allocation of pollution emissions that maximizes total
welfare in Nash equilibrium. These features are shared by the PP-scheme and other schemes
proposed in the literature on pollution environments. For instance, Duggan and Roberts
(2002) introduced a scheme in which each agent chooses his emission and reports the emission
of his neighbor. In Montero (2008) each agent reports his inverse demand for any level of
emissions. The focus of both papers is the implementation of the efficient allocation under
asymmetric information whereas we are interested in the distributional impacts of a scheme
that implements the efficient allocation under perfect information. The Vickrey-Clark-Groves
(VCG)-scheme, which makes each agent pay for his marginal impact to society, has a similar
flavor to our PP-scheme. However, as we explain in Section 6, the two schemes differ. In
particular, the VCG-scheme applied to the pollution problem does not satisfy non-negativity
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while the PP-scheme does. Furthermore, we show that the PP-scheme is incentive compatible
when damages are known (and benefits are private information) whereas the VCG-scheme is
incentive compatible when both damages and benefits are private information.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 introduces a simple model of pollution with constant
marginal damages. It also provides several real-world examples which fit our framework. Sec-
tion 3 describes regulation schemes and their induced distribution rules in equilibrium. It also
discusses several regulations used in real life. Section 4 introduces the polluter-pays regulation
and characterizes its induced distribution rule in terms of non-negativity and responsibility
for pollution impact. Section 5 generalizes our model to differentiate pollution and damages
in order to allow increasing marginal damages. We generalize the PP principle and extend our
main results to this framework. Section 6 compares the PP-scheme with VCG-scheme and
discusses preference revelation for the PP-scheme. Section 7 concludes.
2 A Model of Pollution
Consider a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents (countries, cities, farmers, firms, consumers,...).
Each agent i ∈ N is polluting or is polluted or both. Agent i enjoys a benefit bi(ei) from
production and/or consumption where ei ≥ 0 denotes i’s level of economic activity hereafter
called “emissions”. The benefit function bi is assumed to be both strictly concave and strictly
increasing from 0 to a maximum eˆi with b
′
i(eˆi) = 0 for every i ∈ N , and twice continuously
differentiable: for all i ∈ N and for all 0 ≤ ei < eˆi, both b′i(ei) > 0 and b′′i (ei) < 0. We
normalize bi(0) = 0 and assume that the marginal benefit at ei = 0 is high enough (say
infinite) so it is optimal for all agents to produce and/or to consume.
Pollution from agent i causes marginal damage aij ≥ 0 to agent j. The parameter aij
measures the magnitude of the pollution impact of i’s emission on j. For the moment we
consider constant marginal damages. Later we extend our results to environments with convex
damages and thus, increasing marginal damages from emissions. A (negative) externality or
pollution problem (N, b, a) is defined by a set of agents N , a profile of benefit functions
b = (bi)i∈N , and a matrix of externality/pollution marginal impacts a = [aij ]ij∈N×N . When
there is no confusion, we write for short a instead of (N, b, a). Throughout we assume that
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aii > 0 for any i ∈ N with
∑
j∈N\{i} aij > 0, i.e. if i is polluting other agents, then his
pollution causes some damage at his location. Let
A = {a = [aij ]ij∈N×N : aij ≥ 0 for all ij ∈ N ×N & aii > 0 for all i ∈ N with
∑
j∈N\{i}
aij > 0}
denote the set of all problems.
Given a ∈ A, let Ri(a) = {j ∈ N |aij > 0} denote the receptors of i’s pollution: the set of
agents which are polluted by i. Let R0i(a) = {j ∈ N\{i}|aij > 0} denote the receptors of i’s
pollution excluding i. Let Si(a) = {j ∈ N |aji > 0} denote the set of agents who pollute agent
i. Let S0i(a) = {j ∈ N\{i}|aji > 0} denote the set of agents who pollute i excluding i. When
a is fixed, we write for short Ri, R0i, Si and S0i instead of Ri(a), R0i(a), Si(a) and S0i(a).
Let a ∈ A be a problem. The environmental damage suffered by i in the emission vector
e = (ei)i∈N is therefore
di =
∑
j∈Si
ajiej .
The welfare of agent i with emissions e = (ei)i∈N is
bi(ei)− di = bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Si
ajiej . (1)
The first term in (1) is i’s benefit from his own emissions whereas the second term is i’s welfare
loss due to pollution.
An efficient emission plan e∗ = (e∗i )i∈N maximizes total welfare
∑
i∈N [bi(ei)− di] =∑
i∈N bi(ei)−
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Si ajiei. It satisfies the following first-order conditions for every i ∈ N :
b′i(e
∗
i ) =
∑
j∈Ri
aij . (2)
Note that our assumptions on the benefit function bi guarantee that e
∗
i is unique because
b′i(eˆi) = 0 and bi is strictly concave and strictly increasing between 0 and eˆi. The marginal
benefit of pollution emitted by i should be equal to its marginal damage for society. Let
W (a) =
∑
i∈N
bi(e
∗
i )−
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Si
ajie
∗
i
denote the economy’s welfare from the efficient emission plan e∗ in the problem (N, b, a).5 A
welfare distribution for the problem (N, b, a) is a vector z = (zi)i∈N ∈ RN such that
∑
i∈N zi ≤
5Although the pollution problem is defined not only by the matrix a but also by the vector b and the set
N , we often omit b and N in the notation because we consider only variations of a in the properties.
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W (a). A distribution rule φ associates with any problem (N, b, a) a welfare distribution φ(a)
for a, i.e. φ : A → RN such that ∑i∈N φi(a) ≤ W (a) for all a ∈ A. Note that a distribution
rule identifies for each problem a welfare distribution which the society may wish to implement.
The externality problem (N, b, a) exhibits multilateral externalities if Si = Ri for any
i ∈ N . The problem (N, b, a) exhibits unilateral externalities if S0i ∩ R0i = ∅ for any i ∈ N .
Let V ⊆ N denote the set of agents who do not pollute other agents and only suffer from
pollution due to other agents’ activities. Formally, for any i ∈ V , aij = 0 for all j 6= i and
aji > 0 for at least one j 6= i, or equivalently R0i = ∅ and S0i 6= ∅; and without loss of
generality, eˆi = 0.
6 Similarly, let P ⊆ N denote the set of agents who do not suffer from other
agents’ pollution: aij > 0 for some j 6= i and aji = 0 for all j 6= i, that is R0i 6= ∅ and S0i = ∅.
Note that any agent in N\V is polluting the society from his economic activities.
Below we describe briefly four real-life applications which can be easily accommodated
with our model.
In the river pollution problem, the agents (countries, cities or factories) are located along a
river. Each agent i emits ei units of pollution which impact its followers downstream: one unit
emitted at i causes marginal damage aij at j. Symmetrically, agent i suffers from pollution
emitted upstream by agents and himself.7 In a single canal or one-tributary river, agents are
ordered according to their position from downstream to upstream, say N = {1, ..., n}, and for
any i ∈ N , Ri = {1, 2, . . . , i} and Si = {i, i + 1, . . . , n}. Note that this a case of unilateral
externalities.8
In the international greenhouse gas emissions game, the agents are countries. Greenhouse
gases emitted into the atmosphere cause global warming that damages countries’ economies.
The magnitude of global warming depends on total emissions on the earth surface
∑
j∈N ej .
Suppose that total emissions cause a constant marginal damage of δi to country i. In this
6If eˆi > 0, then agent i’s activity does not have any impact on society and his activities can be disregarded.
7In the case of a river, “linearity is a good approximation up to the point at which the river becomes so
overloaded with organic material that oxygen (needed for aerobic bacteriological decomposition) is depleted.
At that point, [refereed as the river carrying capacity] the river’s capacity to clean itself is greatly diminished.”
from Kolstad (2000) footnote 2 page 177.
8See Ambec and Sprumont (2002) and Ambec and Ehlers (2008) for a rigorous analysis of the river water
sharing problem. Demange (2004) considers stability in hierarchies given by trees.
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example, Si = Ri = N and aii = aij = δi for all i, j ∈ N : all countries exert multilateral
externalities on all other countries of the same magnitude.9
In the international acid rain game, agents are countries emitting sulfur dioxide (SO2) by
burning coal for power production. This causes acid rain which damages forests and ecosystems
in neighboring countries. The parameter aij captures the marginal impact of country i’s SO2
emissions to acid rain in country j.10
In the polluters versus victims problem, agents in V are individuals and those in P are
firms, and each agent belongs either to V or to P . Firms emit pollution without incurring any
damage: for any i ∈ P , aji = 0 for every j 6= i. In contrast, any i ∈ V does not emit pollution
but suffers from pollution: eˆi = 0 for every i ∈ V and aji > 0 for at least one j ∈ P . In
this case, aji can be interpreted as the marginal damage which each unit of firm j’s pollution
causes to person i in term of health or environmental impact. The main difference with the
previous examples is that emitters and victims are disjunct sets of agents. This is a case of
unilateral externalities.11
3 Regulation Schemes and Distribution Rules
The policy tools used for pollution problems can be characterized as regulation schemes. A
regulation scheme t : RN+ −→ RN specifies for any emissions a vector of payments (or transfers)
t(e) = (ti(e))i∈N . It assigns to agent i the transfer ti(e) for any emission plan e = (ei)i∈N .
9Seminal papers on international agreements for greenhouse emission reduction are Chandler and Tulkens
(1992), Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Barrett (1994).
10Ma¨ler and De Zeeuw (1998) provide estimations on those parameters for 1990 and 1991 in Europe. Ma¨ler
(1989, 1994) considers an acid rain game with such heterogeneous “transportation” parameters and constant
marginal damages. This game has been extended by Ma¨ler and De Zeeuw (1998) and Finus and Tjøtta (2003)
to environments with convex marginal damages.
11One can easily check that all our results remain valid if we restrict the set of all problems in the following
way: let H = (Hi)i∈N be such that for all i ∈ N , (i) Hi ⊆ N and (ii) i ∈ Hi if Hi\{i} 6= ∅. Now let
AH = {a ∈ A : Ri(a) = Hi for all i ∈ N}.
Now we can fix H to accommodate any of the applications above. For instance, for the river pollution problem,
we set Hi = {1, 2, . . . , i} for all i ∈ N .
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Given the scheme t and the emission plan e, agent i’s welfare under the vector t(e) is given by
bi(ei)− di + ti(e) = bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Si
ajiej + ti(e). (3)
Of course, each agent i chooses his own emissions and for any problem a, the regulation scheme
t induces an “emissions game” given by the game form where each agent’s set of strategies
consists of all emissions in R+ and the outcome function is t. Let N (t, a) denote the set of
(pure) non-cooperative Nash equilibria in the emissions game under the scheme t and the
problem a.
In the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of the externality problem with scheme t, each
player i maximizes (3) with respect to ei given e−i = (ej)j∈N\{i}. Let et ∈ N (t, a) be a Nash
equilibrium emission plan. Agent i’s equilibrium welfare under et is
zti = bi(e
t
i)− dti + ti(et),
where dti =
∑
j∈Si ajie
t
j . The total welfare is
W t(a) =
∑
i∈N
zti =
∑
i∈N
[
bi(e
t
i)− dti + ti(et)
]
=
∑
i∈N
bi(e
t
i)−
∑
i∈N
dti +
∑
i∈N
ti(e
t),
where in the last expression the first term is the total benefit from emission, the second is the
total damage and the third is the regulation scheme surplus (or deficit if negative).
Given a distribution rule φ and a scheme t, we say that t implements φ (in Nash equilib-
rium) if for all problems a ∈ A and all et ∈ N (t, a), we have
φi(a) = z
t
i = bi(e
t
i)−
∑
j∈Si
ajie
t
j + ti(e
t).
A particular regulation scheme is the laissez-faire scheme tlf defined by tlfi (e) = 0 for
all i ∈ N and all e ∈ RN+ . The laissez-faire scheme represents situations without regulation
or where society chooses not to intervene. It implements the emission plan elf = (elfi )i∈N
satisfying the following first-order conditions,
b′i(e
lf
i ) = aii,
for every i ∈ N . Thus, for each problem a, N (tlf , a) is unique and implicitly given by the
above equalities. In contrast to the efficient emission plan e∗, under laissez-faire each agent i
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considers the impact of his emissions only on his own welfare. In particular, elfi = eˆi if aii = 0.
As long as aij > 0 for some j 6= i, i.e. i’s emissions have an impact on another agent j, then
elfi > e
∗
i and therefore d
lf
j > d
∗
j for every j ∈ Ri.
Many regulation schemes are used in practice. For instance, consider a norm on pollution
emissions scheme, denoted by t¯. It defines upper bounds on emissions e¯i ≥ 0 and penalties for
exceeding these bounds. Formally, let e¯ = (e¯i)i∈N and for all e ∈ RN+ ,
t¯i(e) =
 0 if ei ≤ e¯i−Fi(ei − e¯i) if ei > e¯i
for every i ∈ N where Fi > 0 is the fine in case of excess pollution (which can be infinite or
lump-sum). In case of an uniform norm, e¯i = e¯j and Fi = Fj for all i, j ∈ N . If the fine is
high enough to be persuasive and the norm is binding in the sense that elfi > e¯i for all i ∈ N ,
then the unique emission plan implemented in Nash equilibrium by t¯ are et¯i = e¯i for all i ∈ N .
The emission fee scheme tf specifies fees f = (fi)i∈N on emissions and, therefore, charges
the payment tfi (e) = −fiei from agent i. Here fi > 0 is polluter i’s tax rate. The Pigouvian
fee is fi =
∑
j∈R0i aij for every polluter i ∈ N . It implements the first-best emissions e∗ in
Nash equilibrium. Alternatively, the fee can be on ambient pollution rather than on emissions.
An ambient pollution fee scheme tF charges Fj > 0 per unit of emissions at each receptor j
which makes agent i pay tFi (e) = −
(∑
j∈Ri aijFj
)
ei . The emission or ambient pollution fee
scheme can be associated with a redistribution policy of the money collected, e.g. through
lump-sum transfers or subsidies.
A further important regulation instrument that can be embedded in our model is cap-and-
trade or tradable emission permits. Agents are endowed with some initial emissions allowances
or permits e¯ = (e¯i)i∈N which can be traded in a market. They are not allowed to emit more
than the amount of permits they own at the end of a pre-defined phase (trade occurs at the
same time as pollution in the European EUTS market). Providing that the permit market is
competitive (implying that agents are price takers), the tradable emission permit regulation
is as if each agent i faces a transfer scheme ttpi (e) = p(e¯i− ei) where p is the equilibrium price
of permits. This price is uniquely determined by the first-order conditions b′j(e
t
j)− ajj = p for
every j ∈ N\V and the market clearing condition ∑j∈N e¯j = ∑j∈N etj . The initial allocation
of permits impacts the level and distribution of welfare. Under grandfathering, each agent is
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assigned a share of his or her laissez-faire emission e¯i = αe
lf
i with 0 < α ≤ 1. A lower α means
lower emissions in the economy. When permits are auctioned by the government, it is as if
those who get the revenue from this auction are endowed with the permits. For instance, if
the money is used exclusively to reduce or compensate the damage at agent h’s location, then
it is as if agent h obtains all permits and trades them with polluters in a competitive market,
i.e. e¯h =
∑
j∈N\V e
t
j . Emission allowances can also be defined on receptors emissions, each
agent i potentially owning e¯ij emission allowances at receptor j that can be exchange against
other emission allowances for the same receptor j.
Given the abundance of different regulation schemes in reality, a society would like to
distinguish between them according to desirable criteria. The following will be two very basic
requirements any society would like any regulation to comply with.
Efficiency requires that the first-best outcome is implemented in Nash equilibrium.
Efficiency: For all problems a and all et ∈ N (t, a), we have et = e∗.
The second property requires that the payments of the scheme induce no budget deficit at
Nash equilibrium.
(Budget) Feasibility: For all problems a and all et ∈ N (t, a), we have ∑i∈N ti(et) ≤ 0.
A (budget) feasible regulation scheme t where N (t, a) is a singleton for any a, say N (t, a) =
{et}, induces a distribution rule φt of the total welfare. For any problem a ∈ A, the distribution
rule implemented by the feasible scheme t is given by
φti(a) = bi(e
t
i)−
∑
j∈Si
ajie
t
j + ti(e
t) for all i ∈ N.
Any of the above regulation schemes is feasible and has a unique Nash equilibrium, and hence,
induces a corresponding distribution rule. We now focus on a particular regulation scheme,
the one inspired by the polluter-pays principle.
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4 Welfare Properties of the Polluter-Pays Principle
In this section, we first describe the polluter-pays scheme and show two of its properties,
namely feasibility and efficiency. Second, we examine the properties of the welfare distribu-
tion rules implemented by regulation schemes in Nash equilibrium, and in particular by the
polluter-pays welfare distribution rule.
4.1 The Polluter-Pays Scheme
Many countries pay lip-service to the “polluter-pays” (PP) principle as a regulation scheme.
It basically renders the polluter responsible for the damage it causes to the environment. It
requires that the costs of pollution should be borne by the entity which profits from the process
that causes pollution.
In order to satisfy the polluter-pays principle, the entity who pollutes should compensate
those who suffer from this pollution for the damages it causes. If a victim is not fully compen-
sated, then he or she pays part of the cost of someone else’s pollution. Hence, strictly speaking,
the PP principle imposes not only that polluters pay for the damage caused to society, but also
that victims are fully compensated for those damages. In our model, an arbitrary agent i who
pollutes should compensate every agent j ∈ R0i for the caused damage aijei. Agent i pays
aijei to every j ∈ R0i. Therefore, as a victim of pollution, agent i receives the compensation
ajiej from each agent j ∈ S0i who pollutes him. Summing up all these side-payments, the
polluter-pays principle leads to the regulation scheme tPP (e) defined as follows for any agent
i ∈ N :
tPPi (e) =
∑
j∈S0i
ajiej −
∑
j∈R0i
aijei = di − aiiei −
∑
j∈R0i
aijei = di −
∑
j∈Ri
aijei. (4)
Agent i receives the net transfer from the cost of pollution he suffers minus the cost of pollution
he causes to society. Since the polluter-pays principle involves side-payments among agents,
the payments in the PP-scheme sum up to zero. It is therefore (budget) feasible. Agent i’s
welfare under the payments tPP (e) with emission plan e is:
bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Ri
aijei (5)
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Since agent i pays for the marginal damage caused to others and is compensated from the
marginal damage caused by others, his welfare under the PP-scheme in (5) is the social benefit
from his economic activity. Therefore, agent i has incentive to emit the efficient level e∗i for any
given emissions emitted by other agents. Formally, maximizing (5) with respect to ei leads to
the first-order condition (2) which implies eti = e
∗
i for every i ∈ N . This implies that the PP-
scheme implements the efficient emission plan e∗ in Nash equilibrium, i.e. N (tPP , a) = {e∗}.
A particular feature of regulation through the PP-scheme with constant marginal damages is
that, since any individual’s payoffs depend only on the agent’s own choice (no externality),
the efficient emission plan is a dominant strategy equilibrium, which is an equilibrium concept
which is less demanding in terms of cognitive skills than Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the
efficient emission plan remains the unique Nash equilibrium when the parameters a are publicly
known but the benefit functions are private information.
Remark 1 One can check that the efficient emission plan is robust to collusion, i.e. it remains
the unique equilibrium in the PP-scheme if we allow coalitions to jointly change their emissions.
Formally, given scheme t and a ∈ A, e′ ∈ RN+ is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium if there
exists no ∅ 6= U ⊆ N and e′′U = (e′′i )i∈U ∈ RU+ such that for all i ∈ U ,
bi(e
′′
i )−
 ∑
j∈Si∩U
ajie
′′
j +
∑
j∈Si\U
ajie
′
j
+ ti(e′′U , e′N\U ) > bi(e′i)−∑
j∈Si
ajie
′
j + ti(e
′).
Now for any a ∈ A, in the PP-scheme e∗ is the unique coalition-proof Nash equilibrium because
for any non-empty coalition U ⊆ N , (e∗j )j∈U solves max(ej)j∈U≥0
∑
i∈U [bi(ei)−(
∑
j∈Si∩U ajiej+∑
j∈Si\U ajie
∗
j ) + t
PP
i (eU , e
∗
N\U )].
We will denote by φPP the polluter-pays (PP) distribution rule associating with each
problem a the polluter-pays welfare distribution φPP (a): for any i ∈ N , agent i’s equilibrium
welfare is given by
φPPi (a) = bi(e
∗
i )−
∑
j∈Ri
aije
∗
i . (6)
The result below follows straightforwardly from our discussion.
Proposition 1 The polluter-pays scheme is an efficient and feasible regulation scheme im-
plementing the polluter-pays distribution rule.
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4.2 The Polluter-Pays Distribution Rule
The following are two desirable criteria a society would like to be satisfied by the welfare dis-
tributions implemented via a regulation scheme. The first criterion postulates that any agent
should receive a non-negative payoff. This corresponds to the requirement that any agent’s
welfare change should be non-negative because we implicitly set any agent’s welfare equal to
zero in the absence of pollution or emission activities (which is interpreted as the status quo).
Non-Negativity: For all problems a and all i ∈ N , φi(a) ≥ 0.
Non-negativity simply requires that nobody should be worse off under pollution than
without pollution. The second criterion renders the polluter responsible to any change of his
pollution impact on the economy.
Responsibility for Pollution Impact (RPI): Consider any arbitrary agent i ∈ N . Suppose
that agent i’s pollution impact is reduced from a = (aij)j∈N to a′ = (a′ij)j∈N with aij ≥ a′ij
for all j ∈ N , and all other pollution impacts being unchanged (a′lj = alj for all l ∈ N\{i}
and all j ∈ N). The distribution rule φ renders agents responsible for their pollution impact
if for any i ∈ N , any reduction a′ of i’s pollution impact from a,
φi(a
′)− φi(a) = W (a′)−W (a).
Responsibility for pollution impact (RPI) requires to assign to any agent the full return
or loss of any change of his own pollution impact.
In addition to being a fairness principle, RPI has attractive incentive properties. Suppose
that an agent is able to reduce his pollution impact at some cost by switching to a greener
technology, reducing or cleaning its wastes, improving energy efficiency or using less toxic
inputs. By assigning the full return of this pollution reduction, RPI provides efficient incentives
to invest in pollution impact reduction. Symmetrically, if an agent benefits from increasing
his pollution impact per unit of emissions (e.g. using higher sulfur content coal), RPI assigns
to this agent the economic cost of this extra pollution.
Among the above regulations, the Pigouvian fee regulation scheme is efficient. The welfare
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distribution rule associated with the Pigouvian fee regulation scheme satisfies RPI. The Pigou-
vian fee regulation scheme is feasible if the collected revenue is redistributed among agents.
The implemented welfare distribution rule does not satisfy non-negativity unless the money
collected is used to cover agents’ damages: it then leads to the PP welfare distribution when
marginal damage are constant as assumed here. An emission norm e¯i = e
∗
i with a persuasive
fine (e.g. infinite) is efficient and feasible but its welfare distribution does not satisfy RPI and
non-negativity. A cap-and-trade system (with tradable pollution allowances) for pollution at
each receptor with grandfathering is efficient and feasible but its associated welfare distribu-
tion rule does not satisfy non-negativity since victims are not entirely compensated. It might
or might not satisfy RPI depending on the initial allocation of permits.
Theorem 1 The polluter-pays distribution rule is the unique distribution rule that satisfies
non-negativity and responsibility for pollution impact.
Proof. First, we show that if a distribution rule satisfies non-negativity and responsibility for
pollution impact, then it must be the polluter-pays distribution rule φPP . Consider another
distribution rule φ and let a be a problem. Let φ(a) = z˜ and φPP (a) = zPP . Let
∑
i∈N z˜i = W˜ .
Suppose that z˜ 6= zPP . Since ∑i∈N zPPi = W (a) and z˜ is a welfare distribution, we have
W˜ ≤ W (a). Thus, ∑i∈N z˜i ≤ ∑i∈N zPPi which combined with z˜ 6= zPP forces z˜i < zPPi for
some i ∈ N . Note that for all j ∈ V , zPPj = 0 and by non-negativity of φ, z˜j ≥ 0. Thus, we
must have i ∈ N\V and both aii > 0 and eˆi > 0. Let a′ be such that a is a pollution impact
reduction for agent i from a′ such that aii < a′ii and everything else remains identical, i.e.
a′lj = alj for all l, j ∈ N such that lj 6= ii. Pick a′ii sufficiently large such that
bi(e
′lf
i ) < z
PP
i − z˜i (7)
where N (tlf , a′) = {e′lf}. Let φ(a′) = z˜′ and φPP (a′) = z′PP denote the distributions chosen
by φ and φPP for the problem (N, b, a′). By responsibility for pollution impact,
z˜i − z˜′i = zPPi − z′PPi
Rearranging terms and using the definition of zPPi this leads to
zPPi − z˜i = bi(e′∗i )−
∑
j∈Ri
a′ije
′∗
i − z˜′i, (8)
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where e′∗ denotes the efficient emission plan for (N, b, a′). By non-negativity of φ, z˜′i ≥ 0.
Now since bi(e
′lf
i ) ≥ bi(e′∗i ), a′ij ≥ 0 for all j ∈ Ri, and z′i ≥ 0, we obtain from (7),
zPPi − z˜i > bi(e′lfi ) ≥ bi(e′∗i )−
∑
j∈Ri
a′ije
′∗
i − z˜′i,
which contradicts (8).
Second, we show that φPP satisfies non-negativity and responsibility for pollution impact.
For non-negativity,
zPPi = bi(e
∗
i )−
∑
j∈Ri
aije
∗
i = max
ei≥0
bi(ei)−∑
j∈Ri
aijei
 ≥ bi(0)−∑
j∈Ri
aij × 0 = 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that agent i can always choose ei = 0 (no emission
or production).
For responsibility for pollution impact, for any agent i, consider any reduction of i’s pol-
lution impact from a to a′: aij ≥ a′ij for all j ∈ N and (akj)j∈N = (a′kj)j∈N for any k 6= i.
Let φPP (a) = zPP and φPP (a′) = z′PP . Let W (a) and W (a′) denote the corresponding total
welfare in (N, b, a) and (N, b, a′), respectively. Note that by efficiency of tPP , we have both
WPP (a) = W (a) and WPP (a′) = W (a′). Similarly, denote by e∗ and e′∗ the efficient emission
plan of (N, b, a) and (N, b, a′), respectively. By definition,
z′PPi − zPPi = b(e′∗i )−
∑
j∈Ri
a′ije
′∗
ij −
b(e∗i )−∑
j∈Ri
aije
∗
ij
 . (9)
Since akj = a
′
kj for every k 6= i, the efficient emission levels are not affected by the change of
matrix of pollution impacts from a to a′ which implies e∗k = e
′∗
k for every k ∈ N\{i}. Therefore,
we have:
W (a′)−W (a) = b(e′∗i )−
∑
j∈Ri
a′ije
′∗
ij −
b(e∗i )−∑
j∈Ri
aije
∗
ij

which, combined with (9), leads to z′PPi − zPPi = W (a′)−W (a). 
Because for any problem a, φPP (a) is an efficient welfare distribution, Theorem 1 shows
that non-negativity and responsibility for pollution impact imply efficiency, i.e. for any prob-
lem the total welfare is distributed among the agents.
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5 Generalization to Increasing Marginal Damages
We now consider the polluter-pays principle with convex damage functions which requires a
slight modification of the model. We differentiate emissions from pollution and damage. The
emission plan e generates a pollution level pi at i’s location (to receptor i) defined by
pi =
∑
j∈Si
ajiej . (10)
The matrix a defines now the transfer coefficients that translates emissions of i into pollution
of j (e.g. waste water released by i into water pollution concentration on j). Pollution at level
pi causes damages di(pi) to i with di being increasing and convex: di(0) = 0, d
′
i(pi) > 0 and
d′′i (pi) ≥ 0 for every pi ∈ R+ and i ∈ N\P .12 The welfare of agent i with emissions e = (ei)i∈N
is
bi(ei)− di(pi), (11)
where pi is defined by (10). A pollution problem is now described by (N, b, a, d).
The first-order conditions that characterize the unique efficient emission plan e∗ (which
maximizes the total welfare
∑
i∈N [bi(ei)− di(pi)]) are for every i ∈ N13
b′i(e
∗
i ) =
∑
j∈Ri
aijd
′
j(p
∗
j ) =
∑
j∈Ri
aijd
′
j
∑
l∈Sj
alje
∗
l
 . (12)
The marginal benefit of agent i’s emission should be equal to its marginal cost for society
which depends on its marginal impact on pollution aij and the marginal damage of pollution
at each receptor j ∈ Ri. Each unit of emission from agent i leads to aij units of pollution at
receptor j which causes marginal damages evaluated to aijd
′
j(p
∗
j ). The total welfare with the
efficient emission plan e∗ is:
W (a) =
∑
i∈N
[bi(e
∗
i )− di(p∗i )] =
∑
i∈N
bi(e∗i )− di
∑
j∈Si
ajie
∗
j
 .
12Recall that P is the set of only polluter agents.
13The existence of the efficient emission plan e∗ is guaranteed by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem: define
g : ×i∈N [0, eˆi] −→ ×i∈N [0, eˆi] by g(e) = ((b′i)−1(
∑
j∈Ri aijd
′
j(
∑
l∈Sj aljel)))i∈N . Since bi is strictly concave, b
′
i
tends to infinity at zero, and b′i tends to zero at eˆi, g is a well defined function. Our assumptions on damages
ensure that g is continuous. Now since ×i∈N [0, eˆi] is compact and convex, Brouwer’s fixed point theorem
implies that the function g must have a fixed point which is a solution to (12). Uniqueness of e∗ follows from
strict concavity of benefits and convexity of damages.
17
In contrast with constant marginal damages (i.e. the first-order condition in (2)), with in-
creasing marginal damage the efficient level of i’s emission (the first-order condition in (12))
depends on what is emitted by the other polluters of j with j being a receptor of i’s pol-
lution (j ∈ Ri). Marginal damage being increasing with pollution concentration, agent i’s
emission has more impact on damages at j when pollutant emitted by other polluters in R0j
increases. Because a polluter’s marginal impact depends on pollution concentration due to
other polluters, applying the polluter-pays principle in this framework is not straightforward.
One needs to define each polluter’s responsibility on the damage caused to society when com-
puting the “cost of pollution of one entity on others”. With only one single polluter i, agent
i should simply pay the damage dj(aijei) to victim j. However, with more than one polluter
at receptor j, say i and k, the PP principle does not tell us how to share dj(aijei + akjek)
(the overall cost at j) among i and k. If polluter i is held responsible for the first aijej units
of pollution, he has to pay dj(aijei). If polluter i is responsible for the last ones, he has to
pay dj(aijei + akjek) − dj(akjek) which is larger than dj(aijei) by convexity of dj . It is also
increasing with the other polluter k’s emissions. One can think about several ways to share
the damage dj(pj). For instance, it could be assigned proportionally to a polluter’s share on
total pollution, each polluter i paying
aijei
pj
dj(pj) to j for every i ∈ Rj.
Such a division of the damage is defined for given emissions by i and k. Yet, since emissions
are substitutes for receptor j, the presence of i’s emissions at j leads to a reduction of k’s
emissions ek at the first-best. The inter-connection of polluters’ efficient emissions with convex
damage creates a further cost of pollution on society: i’s emission do not only cause damage
at j, it also encroaches on k’s emission at the first-best.
In this framework, we interpret the PP principle of making paying the “cost of pollution
of one entity on others” by charging a polluter the incremental impact of his emissions on
other agents. Due to increasing marginal damage, we can distinguish between two impacts.
A first one is an increase of damage at each receptor j ∈ Ri. The second one is due to the
substitution between polluters’ emissions for each receptor j: if i emits more pollution, then
each polluter k ∈ Sj should emit less at the first-best. We also interpret the PP principle by
compensating each agent exactly for the damage caused by others’ emissions in absence of his
emission. Let us denote by e0i the efficient emission plan without i’s emission for every i ∈ N
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(with fixing e0ii = 0). Notice that e
0i is the efficient plan of the economy without i’s emission
but with i’s damage function di (i.e. agent i is then a “victim only”). It maximizes the total
welfare of the problem (N, b−i, a, d) where by b−i implicitly means that agent i becomes a
victim. The polluter-pays regulation scheme tPP is defined for every i ∈ N by
tPPi (e) = di(p
0i
i )−
∑
j 6=i
[
bj(e
0i
j )− dj(p0ij )− (bj(ej)− dj(pj))
]
. (13)
The transfer is decomposed in two terms. The left-hand term is agent i’s damage at the
first-best without i’s emissions. The summation is the economic loss due to i’s emission for
all other agents j 6= i. For a polluter only agent j ∈ P , the change is simply the loss of benefit
bj(e
0i
j ) − bj(ej). For a polluter j who is a victim of i’s pollution it is the change of welfare
including damage bj(e
0i
j )− dj(p0ij )− (bj(ej)− dj(pj)).
The PP-scheme yields to agent i a total welfare of (noting bi(e
0i
i ) = bi(0) = 0):
bi(ei)− di(pi) + tPPi (e) =
∑
j∈N
[
bj(ej)− dj(pj)− (bj(e0ij )− dj(p0ij ))
]
. (14)
Agent i’s welfare under the PP regulation scheme is his emission’s contribution to total welfare
for any emission plan. Since each agent i internalizes the impact of his own emissions on total
welfare given the other agent’s emissions, the PP principle implements the efficient emission
plan e∗. Indeed, given other agent’s emissions et−i, the maximization of agent i’s welfare
bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Ri
dj
aijei + ∑
l∈Sj\{i}
alje
t
j
+ ∑
j∈N\{i}
bj(e
t
j)−
∑
j∈N\Ri
dj(p
t
j)−
∑
j∈N
(
bj(e
0i
j )− dj(p0ij )
)
with respect to ei leads to the first-order conditions in (12) of the efficient emission plan e
∗.
Therefore, et = e∗ for any et ∈ N (t, a).14 Thus, by (14), agent i’s equilibrium welfare is
φPPi (a) = bi(e
∗
i )− di(p∗i ) + tPPi (e∗) = W (a)−
∑
j∈N
(bj(e
0i
j )− dj(p0ij )). (15)
where W (a) =
∑
j∈N (bj(e
∗
j ) − dj(p∗j )). Similarly as before, we call φPP the polluter-pays
distribution rule (induced by tPP for convex damages). Agent i’s welfare is the incremental
contribution of his emissions at the first-best. For a victim only agent i ∈ V , it simplifies
to zero since he is fully compensated for the damage di(p
∗
i ). A polluter only agent i ∈ P
obtains his first-best benefit bi(e
∗
i ) net of the negative impact of his emissions on society
14Note that if N (t, a) is not a singleton, then there would exist several efficient emission plans.
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∑
j 6=i
[
bj(e
∗
j )− dj(p∗j )− (bj(e0ij )− dj(p0ij ))
]
. Note that since e0ij = e
∗
j with constant marginal
damages for every j 6= i the PP-scheme defined in (13) is a generalization of the one defined
in (4) to convex damage functions. The next proposition shows that tPP induces no budget
deficit.
Proposition 2 The polluter-pays scheme is an efficient and feasible regulation scheme im-
plementing the polluter-pays distribution rule.
Proof. Since tPP is efficient, it suffices to show
∑
i∈N t
PP
i (e
∗) ≤ 0. Note that since e0i is
an efficient emission plan of the problem (N, b−i, a, d) while the emission plan (e∗−i, 0) can be
implemented in (N, b−i, a, d), we have∑
j∈N
[
bj(e
0i
j )− dj(p0ij )
] ≥ −di(p∗i − aiie∗i ) +∑
j 6=i
[
bj(e
∗
j )− dj(p∗j − aije∗i )
]
.
Multiplying both sides with -1, we combine the above inequality with the definition of tPP (e)
in (13) at the first-best and use bi(e
0i
i ) = bi(0) = 0 and aij = 0 for j /∈ Ri, and obtain:
tPPi (e
∗) ≤ di(p∗i − aiie∗i )−
∑
j∈R0i
[
dj(p
∗
j )− dj(p∗j − aije∗i )
]
Summing up all transfers tPPi leads to:∑
i∈N
tPPi (e
∗) ≤
∑
i∈N
(di(p
∗
i − aiie∗i )−
∑
j∈R0i
[
dj(p
∗
j )− dj(p∗j − aije∗i )
]
)
Rearranging terms yields:∑
i∈N
tPPi (e
∗) ≤
∑
i∈N
(di(p
∗
i − aiie∗i )−
∑
j∈S0i
[di(p
∗
i )− di(p∗i − ajie∗j )]). (16)
Consider any i ∈ N . Without loss of generality, let Si = {1, . . . , s}. Since p∗i =
∑
j∈Si ajie
∗
j ,
we can rewrite di(p
∗
i ) by:
di(p
∗
i ) =
s∑
k=1
[di(p
∗
i −
k−1∑
j=1
ajie
∗
j )− di(p∗i −
k∑
j=1
ajie
∗
j )] (17)
Note that for any k = 1, . . . , s, p∗i −
∑k−1
j=1 ajie
∗
j − (p∗i −
∑k
j=1 ajie
∗
j ) = akie
∗
k = p
∗
i − (p∗i −akie∗k)
Thus, by convexity of di, for any k = 1, . . . , s,
di(p
∗
i −
k−1∑
j=1
ajie
∗
j )− di(p∗i −
k∑
j=1
ajie
∗
j ) ≤ di(p∗i )− di(p∗i − akie∗k) (18)
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Combining (17) with (18) for any k = 1, . . . , s leads to:
di(p
∗
i ) ≤
s∑
k=1
[di(p
∗
i )− di(p∗i − akie∗k)] =
∑
j∈Si
[di(p
∗
i )− di(p∗i − ajie∗j )].
By Si = S0i ∪ {i}, this is equivalent to:
di(p
∗
i − aiie∗i ) ≤
∑
j∈S0i
[
di(p
∗
i )− di(p∗i − ajie∗j )
]
.
The last inequality combined with (16) yields the desired conclusion. 
Notice that as along as two polluters impact the same receptors, the PP distribution rule
does not distribute total welfare in the sense that
∑
i∈N φ
PP
i (a) < W (a). To see that, suppose
that N = {1, 2, 3} with polluters 1 and 3 polluting only victim 2, i.e. ai2 > 0 for i = 1, 3. Then
polluter 1 has to pay the incremental damage at 2, formally d2(a12e
∗
1 + a32e
∗
3)− d2(a32e013 ) as
well as the loss of benefit for 3, that is b3(e
01
3 ) − b3(e∗3). Similarly polluter 3 has to pay for
the increment damages at 2 and benefit loss for 1 due to his emissions. The victim 2 receives
a compensation equals to the damage d2(p
∗
2). Yet, the total payment by 1 and 3 more than
offsets the compensation to 2: tPP1 (e
∗) + tPP3 (e∗) + tPP2 (e∗2) < 0 because −tPP1 (e∗)− tPP3 (e∗) >
tPP2 (e
∗
2) = d2(a12e
∗
1 + a32e
∗
3). The PP regulation scheme exhibits a financial surplus and,
therefore, the PP regulation rule distributes strictly less than total welfare.
To characterize the PP distribution rule φPP with marginal increasing damages, we in-
troduce a further fairness principle, called single-polluter (social welfare) upper bounds. Its
motivation relies on polluters’ claims on the welfare improvement due to their economic ac-
tivity as explained in the introduction or, equivalently, on their claim on payments when
applying the PP principle. To minimize his payment, a polluter would claim responsibility
only on the damage impact due to his own emission in absence of any other pollution at
each receptor j ∈ Ri (including himself). We call it agent i’s single-polluter welfare. Un-
der this interpretation of the PP principle each agent i would enjoy an individual welfare of
maxei≥0[bi(ei) −
∑
j∈Ri dj(aijei)]. On the other hand, applying the PP principle requires to
fully compensate any agent j for the damage dj(pj). With (strictly) convex damage functions
we have
∑
i∈Sj dj(aijei) < dj(pj) = dj
(∑
i∈Sj aijei
)
whenever |Sj| > 1 and pj > ei, and such
an interpretation of the polluter pays principle would lead to unbalanced transfers. One way
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to reconcile a distribution rule (or feasible transfers) with the above claims is to impose that,
by solidarity, no agent should get more than the claimed single-polluter welfare.
Single-Polluter Upper Bounds: For all problems a and all i ∈ N , φi(a) ≤ maxei≥0[bi(ei)−∑
j∈Ri dj(aijei)].
A second, and more fundamental, justification of solidarity upper bounds finds its roots
in Moulin’s notion of group externality (Moulin, 1990). Under increasing marginal damage,
the presence of pollution from other sources might reduce the ability of a polluter to emit.
Formally, let us denote by e0−ii polluter i’s efficient emission when i is the only polluter to emit
(ej = 0 for every j 6= i). It is the efficient emission plan to the problem (N, bi, a, d) (where bi
means that all agents in N\{i} become victims). It is also the solution to the maximization
problem in the single-polluter upper bounds property. Note that if there exist j ∈ Ri and
k ∈ Sj with k 6= i, then e0−ii > e∗i : agent i could pollute more in the absence of k. Doing
so, under the PP regulation scheme tPP , he could enjoy a welfare of bi(e
0−i
i ) − di(p0−ii ) +
tPPi (e
0−i) = maxei≥0[bi(ei) −
∑
j∈Ri dj(aijei)], which is higher than his welfare under the
emission plan e∗. In Moulin’s terms, the presence of other polluters exhibits a negative group
externality on polluter i. Single-polluter upper bounds require that every polluter who creates
this negative group externality should take up a share of it. For victim only polluters i ∈ V ,
the single-polluter upper bound is equal to zero which is their welfare under the PP-scheme.15
We now provide our characterization of the PP principle generalized to increasing marginal
damages.
Theorem 2 The polluter-pays distribution rule is the unique distribution rule that satisfies
non-negativity, responsibility for pollution impact and the single-polluter upper bounds.
Proof. Let φ be a distribution rule satisfying non-negativity, responsibility for pollution
impact and the solidarity upper bounds. Let a be a problem, φ(a) = z and φPP (a) = y∗.
15It is worth to notice that for linear damages the single-polluter upper bounds of any agent i coincide with
his welfare under φPP (a). This is because the social impact of a polluter does not depend on emissions by
others: it is the same whatever the others are emitting.
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Suppose that z 6= y∗. Note that for all i ∈ V , by non-negativity and solidarity upper bounds,
zi = 0 = y
∗
i . Thus, there exists i ∈ N\V such that zi 6= y∗i .
Let a′ii > aii. Consider the problem where aii changes to a
′
ii and everything else remains
identical, i.e. a′ = (a−ii, a′ii). Let φ(a
′) = z′, φPP (a′) = y′∗, and e′∗ denote the efficient
emission plan for a′.
By RPI,
zi − z′i = W (a)−W (a′) = y∗i − y′∗i .
Now we may take limits, i.e.
lim
a′ii→+∞
zi − z′i = lim
a′ii→+∞
W (a)−W (a′)
= lim
a′ii→+∞
y∗i − y′∗i ,
and we obtain
zi − lim
a′ii→+∞
z′i = W (a)− lim
a′ii→+∞
W (a′)
= y∗i − lim
a′ii→+∞
y′∗i .
Note that lima′ii→+∞maxei≥0[bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Ri dj(a
′
ijei)] = 0. Therefore, by non-negativity and
solidarity upper bounds, both lima′ii→+∞ z
′
i = 0 = lima′ii→+∞ y
′∗
i . But now we obtain
zi = W (a)− lim
a′ii→+∞
W (a′) = y∗i ,
which contradicts zi 6= y∗i .
Second, we show that φPP satisfies RPI, non-negativity and solidarity upper bounds. From
(15) it is straightforward that φPP satisfies RPI because e0i is optimal for both (N, b−i, a, d)
and (N, b−i, a′, d) whenever i’s pollution impact is reduced (with a′lj = alj for all l ∈ N\{i}
and all j ∈ N). Since e0i can be implemented as an emission plan in the problem (N, b, a, d),
W (a) ≥ ∑j∈N (bj(e0ij ) − dj(p0ij )) and, therefore, by (15), φPP satisfies non-negativity. For
solidarity upper bounds, first note that by convexity of dj ,
16 we have for any ei ≥ 0,
dj(aijei) ≤ dj(aijei + p∗−ij )− dj(p∗−ij ),
16Note that dj(0) = 0 and therefore, dj is superadditive: dj(u) + dj(v) ≤ dj(u+ v) for any u, v ∈ R+.
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where p∗−ij =
∑
k∈Rj\{i} akje
∗
k. Therefore, for any i ∈ N and ei ≥ 0,
bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Ri
(
dj(aijei + p
∗−i
j )− dj(p∗ij )
)
≤ bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Ri
dj(aijei).
Maximizing both sides of the inequality with respect to ei leads to:
bi(e
∗
i )−
∑
j∈Ri
(
dj(p
∗
j )− dj(p∗j − aije∗i )
) ≤ max
ei≥0
[bi(ei)−
∑
j∈Ri
dj(aijei)]. (19)
Second, since e0i maximizes −di(pi) +
∑
j∈N\{i}(bj(ej) − dj(pj)) while (0, e∗−i) is a possible
emission plan for (N, b−i, a, d), it yields a higher total welfare:
−di(p0ii ) +
∑
j∈N\{i}
(bj(e
0i
j )− dj(p0ij )) ≥ −di(p∗i − aiie∗i ) +
∑
j∈N\{i}
(bj(e
∗
j )− dj(p∗j − aije∗i )).
Multiplying both sides by −1, adding W (a) to both sides, and using the definition of φPP in
(15) yields:
φPPi (a) ≤ bi(e∗i )−
∑
j∈Ri
(dj(p
∗
j )− dj(p∗j − aije∗i )).
The last inequality combined with (19) shows that solidarity upper bounds holds for all
i ∈ N . 
For linear damages, by Theorem 1, non-negativity and responsibility for pollution impact
imply that for any problem the total welfare is distributed among the agents. For increasing
marginal damages, non-negativity, responsibility for pollution impact (RPI) and solidarity
upper bounds imply that not for any problem the total welfare is distributed among the
agents. Here RPI does not imply efficiency.
6 PP versus VCG
6.1 VCG and Pollution Emissions
We compare the PP-scheme with the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG)-scheme applied to economies
with externalities.17 A VCG-scheme would make each agent pay or receive his impact on total
17In a setting with a finite set of alternatives and where agents reveal their utilities, Moulin (1986) charac-
terized VCG-schemes by strategy-proofness (agents reveal their true utilities) and other properties (see also
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welfare. Given that agents are choosing emission levels, the VCG-scheme tV CG assigns to
every i ∈ N ,
tV CGi (e) =
∑
j 6=i
(bj(ej)− dj(pj)) + ki,
where ki is a constant which does not dependent on agent i’s emissions.
18 It leads to the
VCG-distribution rule φV CG defined by
φV CGi (a) = W (a) + ki.
The PP principle can be seen as a special case of the VCG-scheme where, for every i ∈ N ,
the constant terms are19
ki = di(p
0i
i )−
∑
j 6=i
(bj(e
0i
j )− dj(p0ij ))
Another special case of the VCG-scheme is the pivotal scheme tpiv which sets the constant
parameters as
ki = −max
e−i
∑
j 6=i
(bj(ej)− dj(pj))
 ,
for every i ∈ N (where pj =
∑
l∈Sj\{i} aljel). The lump-sum transfer paid by i is the total
welfare at the first-best without i. Note that “without i” here means both without i’s emission
and without i’s damage. Let e−i∗ denote the solution to the above maximization program,
that is the efficient emission plan of the pollution problem without i denoted (N, b−i, a−i, d−i)
for every i ∈ N . The pivotal scheme tpiv assigns to every i ∈ N ,
tpivi (e) =
∑
j 6=i
(bj(ej)− dj(pj))−
∑
j 6=i
(bj(e
−i∗
j )− dj(p−i∗j )).
Under the pivotal scheme, each agent i obtains the total welfare net of the welfare without i
at the first-best. Therefore, agent i internalizes the impact of his emission on society which
Thomson (1976) for the case of two alternatives). Note that here agents simply choose their emission (like in
real life) and do not report utility functions and the set of emissions is infinite. The case of agents reporting
their preferences (benefits and damages) is briefly analyzed in Section 6.2.
18Note that, in the general model with convex damages, efficiency (or RPI) requires ki cannot depends on
the emissions by other agents e−i for every i ∈ N . In contrast, with linear damages, since agents’ best reply
functions are orthogonal, e∗i is independent of e
∗
−i for every i ∈ N .
19Note that the constant ki depends on i’s preferences via his damage function di which impacts e
0i.
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means that the pivotal scheme is efficient, i.e. N (tpiv, a) = {e∗}. It leads to the pivotal
distribution rule φpiv defined for every i ∈ N by:
φpivi (a) = W (a)−
∑
j 6=i
(bj(e
−i∗
j )− dj(p−i∗j )).
Each agent i ∈ N obtains the difference between the welfare with and without him at the first-
best. In case of unilateral externalities, for a victim-only agent i ∈ V , φpivi (a) < 0 because i’s
presence in the economy reduces total welfare. Therefore, non-negativity of the distribution
rule induced by tpiv is violated. Indeed, agent i does not only bring his damage di to the
economy which diminishes welfare, it also forces polluters j ∈ Si to reduce their emissions.
Hence, in addition to not being compensated for the damage di(p
∗
i ), a victim i has to pay
for the loss of welfare which his presence causes to the polluters, namely
∑
j∈Si[(bj(e
−i∗
j ) −
dj(p
−i∗
j )) − (bj(e∗j ) − dj(p∗j ))]. For a polluter-only agent i ∈ P , the PP and pivotal welfare
coincide because e0ij = e
−i∗
j for every j ∈ N\{i} while di = 0 for any i ∈ P . Therefore
φPPi (a) = φ
piv
i (a) for any i ∈ P . With multilateral externalities pollution is a public bad and
the pollution problem is closer to the public good provision framework in which the pivotal
scheme has been put forward. Although the pivotal scheme satisfies responsibility for pollution
impact (RPI) and the single-polluter upper bounds, it fails to satisfy non-negativity. An agent
i adds both new emission ei and new damage di to the welfare. Agent i pollutes other agents
and forces in addition them to reduce their own emissions from e−i∗j to e
∗
j for every j ∈ Si
and j ∈ Sk\{i} where k ∈ Ri for convex damage function di. Therefore, under multilateral
externalities, we may have tpivi (e
∗) < 0. It is easy to find examples in which the negative
impact of his presence tpivi (e
∗) to society is not compensated by i’s net benefit bi(e∗i )− di(p∗i )
at the first-best meaning that φpivi (a) < 0 for every i ∈ N .20 This is a major drawback of the
pivotal scheme. Under the PP principle, agents pay for the negative impact of their emissions
on society, and they are compensated for their incurred damage.
6.2 Preference Revelation and Incentive Compatibility
While the focus is here on agents choosing emission levels, one could take an alternative ap-
proach whereby agents reveal preferences and afterwards an emission plan is chosen which is
20A detailed example is available from the authors upon request.
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efficient for the revealed preferences. Transfers are determined according to revealed prefer-
ences. Agent i’s preference is given by his benefit bi and his damage di. Let (b, d) = (bi, di)i∈N .
A general VCG-distribution rule is defined by transfers
tV CGi (b, d) =
∑
j 6=i
(bj(e
∗
j )− dj(p∗j )) + h−i(b−i, d−i), (20)
where e∗ is the efficient emission plan for (b, d) and h−i is an arbitrary function. Then the
distribution rule (using (b, d) as arguments) based on tV CG is defined for all i ∈ N by
φV CGi (b, d) = bi(e
∗
i )− di(p∗i ) + tV CGi (b, d).
Because e∗ is an efficient emission plan and revealing arbitrary (bi, di) induces changes of the
emissions, revealing the true (bi, di) weakly dominates revealing any other (b
′
i, d
′
i). In other
words, the VCG-scheme is incentive compatible because truth-telling is a weakly dominant
strategy. Formally, a general distribution rule φ is incentive compatible if for all (b, d), all
i ∈ N and all (b′i, d′i) we have
φi(b, d) ≥ φi((b′i, b−i), (d′i, d−i))
(where all benefits and damages are supposed to satisfy our conditions). It is well known
that in our quasi-linear setting any incentive compatible distribution rule must be a general
VCG-distribution rule with some functions h−i.
If damages are complete information, setting
hpiv−i (b−i, d−i) = di(p
0i
i ) +
∑
j 6=i
(bj(e
0i
j )− dj(p0ij )),
the pivotal distribution rule using transfers tpiv (for fixed damages) is identical with the PP-
scheme. Then the PP-scheme is incentive compatible for revealing true benefit functions.
Once damages are not known, PP is not incentive compatible because the function h−i cannot
depend on the damage di. Therefore the pivotal scheme and PP-scheme differ when preferences
(benefits and damages) are private information.
7 Conclusion
Most of the economic literature on the choice of policy instruments to tackle environmental
issues focuses on efficiency. In contrast here, we analyze the fairness properties of welfare
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distributions implemented by environmental regulations. To do so, we rely on a general model
in which agents can be polluters, victims of pollution or both. We assume that the benefit from
emitting pollutants is separated from the damage due to pollution. This allows disentangling
two effects of pollution emissions on individuals: the direct externality on the victims and the
indirect externality on other polluters. Pollution does not only increase damages, but it also
reduces the amount of pollution that other polluters emit at first-best. In Moulin (1990)’s
terms, the presence of other polluters creates a negative group externality. Although the group
externality is absent with constant marginal damages, it is present when marginal damages
are increasing with pollution. We introduce welfare bounds that mitigate the negative impact
of the two externalities. The non-negativity lower bounds limits the pollution externality: it
makes sure that nobody is worse off with pollution than without. The single-polluter upper
bounds share the cost of the group externality among polluters: no polluter obtains more than
what he would achieve without group externality. In addition to the above two bounds on
welfare, we introduce a fairness criterion called responsibility for pollution impact (RPI) that
accounts for both externalities. When a polluter reduces his pollution impact on society, this
does not only reduce the damages he causes. It also increases the benefit of other pollutants
by allowing them to emit more at the first-best. RPI requires that a polluter obtains exactly
the full return of his reduction, which includes the effect of both externalities. It turns out
that the only welfare distribution rule satisfying the three criteria is the one implemented by
the polluter-pays principle.
Although our focus was on fairness properties, the scheme based on the polluter-pays
principle has also interesting properties when pollution emissions or benefits from emissions
are not observed by the regulator. It is indeed incentive compatible for choosing the efficient
emission levels or for revealing the true benefit functions. To that respect, it can be seen as a
special case of the VCG-scheme, which is not the pivotal scheme. Yet when both benefits and
damages are private information, unlike the VCG-scheme, the polluter-pays scheme cannot be
used because information on damages is necessary to determine the transfers of the PP-scheme.
Our analysis can be extended in many directions.21 First, instead of increasing marginal
damages, one may consider decreasing marginal damages. Although this assumption is not
21We thank a referee for raising these interesting issues.
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common in environmental economics, such problems might arise in previously-unspoiled nat-
ural environments, where the first action causes the greatest damage, and subsequent actions
may matter rather less. Then there may exist multiple efficient emission plans which induce
different welfare distributions and one may have to identify additional criteria to select one
efficient emission plan.
Second, we did not consider behavioral changes of victims from pollution. In many cases,
victims have several actions available via which they can protect themselves from harmful
impacts of pollution. They can move further away from the source of pollution, invest in
air-cleaning devices, better isolate their homes against noise or filtrate unsafe water. Such
responses are often called “defense activities”. It is well-known that compensating fully vic-
tims of pollution causes underinvestment (or no investment at all) in defensive activities (see
Baumol and Oates (1988, p21) for a discussion on this issue). With defensive activities, our
literal interpretation of the polluter-pays principle would lead to an inefficient outcome. To
improve efficiency, the responsibility for pollution impact needs to be shared among all agents:
polluters and victims of pollution. The relative share assigned to each agent is not straight-
forwardly defined and is context specific. Whether efficiency can be achieved together with
some fairness properties is an open question. We leave this for future research.
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